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Abstract  
Our study aims to verify the effects of social relations, opportunistic behavior and trust among partners on the 
stability of strategic alliance. In order to test the hypotheses, 221 valid questionnaires collected from top managers 
of 50 strategic alliances in China. Moreover, the results also indicate that contractual governance can moderate the 
influence of high-level social relations on opportunistic behavior and trust between partners. It is found that the 
social relationship of senior managers cannot directly affect the stability of the alliance but can negatively affect 
the opportunistic behavior and positively affect the trust between partners. Opportunistic behavior and trust among 
alliance partners affect the stability of strategic alliance negatively and positively, respectively. Contract 
governance can enhance the influence of senior managers' social relationships on opportunistic behavior. In 
addition, contract governance shows the inverted U-shaped moderating effects on the relationship between senior 
managers' social relations and trust. 
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1. Introduction 
With the development of modern science and technology, the competition mode of product market gradually 
changes from single mode to multiple modes. In this situation, the product renewal speed is accelerating day by 
day, the market competition is more intense, and it is difficult for enterprises to stand on their own strength in the 
market. Therefore, as a new form of modern organization, strategic alliance has been attracted more and more 
attentions by enterprises. The cooperative activities characterized by commitment and trust carried out by partners 
in the strategic alliance to achieve strategic goals such as resource sharing and complementary advantages, 
including exclusive purchase agreement, exclusive cooperative production, sharing of technical achievements, 
R&D cooperation agreement and joint marketing (Jorde 1990). The strategic alliance can bring practical benefits 
to the enterprise, including the sharing of enterprise technology so as to achieve the enterprise goals better, to 
achieve more effective development, at the same time, strategic alliances can enhance the ability of enterprises to 
access resources through sharing resources. By taking risks together to reduce the risk of a single enterprise, 
enterprises with relatively weak self-reliance can quickly enter the market and adapt to the market. The Cainiao 
Post Station in China's express industry is a typical successful case of strategic alliance. Several major express 
companies in China used to develop independently. There is no uniform regulation and standard for workflow and 
packaging style, which leads to a great waste of resources and costs. The formation of rookie express station has 
brought several major express companies in China together and formulated common industry standards, workflow 
and service mode. The express companies in the rookie post station use uniform barcode, uniform packaging and 
sharing technology to establish channels together. According to statistics, the total cost saved by Cainiao post 
station for China's express industry each year can reach 1 billion yuan. Of course, not all strategic alliances can 
bring benefits to enterprises. In practice, there are many unstable factors in strategic alliances, and many strategic 
alliances eventually fail. The existing research shows that there are high instability and high failure rate in different 
types, regions and countries (references). The results of KPMG survey show that the failure rate of strategic 
alliance is as high as 60% (Draulans 2003). Harrigan (2010) has investigated more than 800 enterprises and found 
that only 14% of them have cooperated for more than 10 years, and only 40% have cooperated for more than 4 
years, among which 30% - 60% of them are unstable. The failure rate caused by the instability of strategic alliance 
is always high. Many empirical studies show that the instability rate of strategic alliance is as high as 30% - 50% 
when the instability of alliance is defined as the liquidation, merger and reorganization of alliance members, 
Therefore, when managers are optimistic about the benefits brought by the success of the strategic alliance, it is 
necessary to calmly consider the reasons for the instability of the strategic alliance and take appropriate measures 
and strategies to alleviate it (Hamel G 1991). The Le Haha Hot Pot and fresh fruit instant fruit supermarket in 
Shanxi Province of China is a failed alliance case. The original strategic agreement was that fresh fruit would be 
the exclusive supply of high-quality fruit for Le Haha Hot Pot chain store. The lack of trust between the top 
executives of the enterprise cannot be effectively solved as soon as possible after problems occur within the 
alliance, on the contrary, it will make the contradiction between enterprises continue to expand, and eventually 
lead to the collapse of strategic alliance. For a long time, many scholars have studied the influencing factors of the 
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stability of strategic alliance. Chen (2010) analyzed the factors influencing the stability of strategic alliance from 
the aspects of external factors and the relationship between enterprises in the alliance, using Analytic hierarchy 
process and weight quantification, it is found that innovation ability, core competitiveness and consistent strategic 
objectives are the key factors that affect the stability of competitive strategic alliance. Based on the Shapley value 
method, Huang (2013) studies the benefit distribution of international strategic alliance. The results show that the 
rationality of benefit distribution among enterprises is the key to the stability of the alliance, indicating a positive 
correlation between the duration of the alliance. Simonin (2015) takes 147 multinational companies as samples to 
explore the impact of asset specificity, corporate culture differences and organizational distance on alliance 
stability, and finds that asset specificity, corporate culture differences and organizational distance have a 
significant impact on the duration of the alliance. In addition, there are many scholars from the partner matching 
degree (Park 1997), policy environment (Zhang 2004), alliance scale (Niedergassel 2011) and other enterprise 
macro level to consider. Based on data of 203 Spanish companies, Virginia et al (2016) study the relationship 
between CEO's external social network, strategic flexibility and organizational performance, the results show that 
CEO weak social network has a positive impact on strategic flexibility, and weak social network has a significant 
impact on organizational performance. Cai et al (2017) take the data of 421 private enterprises listed on 421 A-
share small and medium-sized boards from 2005 to 2014 as samples, to study the impact of private entrepreneurs' 
political relations on mergers and acquisitions. It is found that the deeper the political relationship between 
entrepreneurs is, the stronger the political relationship is. For this, enterprises are more likely to carry out mergers 
and acquisitions. Corporate executives' social relationship is an important resource for business operation and 
development. The social relationship of executives will affect the acquisition of knowledge, technology, capital 
and other resources in enterprises and strategic alliances, Thus, it is beneficial to the development of enterprises 
and strategic alliances. On the contrary, due to the existence of the orientation of social relations, in the process of 
strategic decision-making and resource allocation, the senior managers of enterprises. It will give priority to the 
more closely related enterprises in the alliance, which will affect the stability of the alliance.  
Based on the existing research findings, from the individual micro level, there are many factors that affect the 
strategic decision-making of the senior management team, including the entrepreneur's personality, education level 
and the social relationship of senior executives. Among them, corporate executives' social relations have a great 
influence on corporate strategic decision-making. Yang et al (2009) took entrepreneurs of new ventures as research 
objects, indicating that the social relationship intensity of entrepreneurs has an impact on resource acquisition, the 
stronger the relationship, the faster the access to entrepreneurial resources. Qiao et al. (2013) uses 1079 senior 
executives of 145 state-owned listed companies in four industries. make an empirical analysis of the relationship 
between senior managers' social relations and organizational financial performance. The results show that the 
external social network contact intensity of executives has a positive impact on business and investment 
performance. There are many studies on the social relations of entrepreneurs in the existing literature, which can 
be seen that the social relations of senior managers play a very important role in the development and management 
of enterprises. However, there are few studies on the relationship between social relations and the stability of 
strategic alliance, under the current social environment in China, social relations have a particularly important 
impact on the stability of business operations and strategic alliances, “Human relationship” plays an important role 
in management and business activities. Under the background that strategic alliance is becoming more and more 
important, it is of great significance to study the relationship between the social relation of entrepreneurs and the 
stability of strategic alliance. In this paper, from the perspective of the micro level of corporate executives' social 
relations, it makes up for the lack of research from the macro level and provides a new perspective for the study 
of the stability of strategic alliance. We have better established the connection between individual social relations 
at the micro level and the stability of strategic alliances at the macro level, which broadens the research field of 
vision. We also include the social path, opportunistic behavior, research on the correlation of trust among partners 
and stability of strategic alliance. On this basis, the adjustment variable of contract governance is added. 
Furthermore, we analyze the moderating role of contract governance in the impact of executive social relations on 
opportunistic behavior and trust among partners, which further reveals the influence path of the social relations of 
the executives on the stability of the strategic alliance. 
 
2. Research Hypotheses 
2.1 The direct influence of corporate executives’ social relations on the stability of strategic alliance 
Duysters and Lemmens (2003) indicate the role of social relations in the formation of strategic technology alliances. 
Their study reveals that when enterprises in social system establish alliances, enterprises often value the direct or 
indirect connection between partners and then choose partners through existing ties, or search for trustworthy 
enterprises in the local region, instead of actively looking for partners other than direct or indirect relationships. 
Yang and Zhu (2017) examine the impact of social relations among business managers on the formation of strategic 
alliances. The social relations of enterprise managers is the key to the formation of the alliance. Enterprises with 
strong connections between managers are more likely to form alliances, and these social relations have an impact 
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on the formation of the alliance and the existing alliance network. That is to say, good social relations contribute 
to the formation of strategic alliances. In addition, social relations can promote information exchange at the 
enterprise level and maintain the stability of existing alliances. Yang (2009) believes that a better business 
friendship between executives can promote exchanges between executives and improve their sense of identity, 
thus it is conducive to the stable development of the strategic alliance. Li et al (2008) divided the partners into 
"acquaintances" and "strangers" according to the number of previous cooperation. It is believed that the familiarity 
of alliance members will have an impact on the development of the alliance. From the above research, social 
relations will have a certain impact on the stability of the alliance. Based on this, the following assumptions are 
proposed: 
H1: Corporate executives’ social relations have a positive impact on the stability of strategic alliance. 
 
2.2 The mediating role of opportunistic behavior and trust 
2.2.1 The mediating role of opportunism 
Barney et al. (1994) believed that if there was a strong social relationship between partners, the role of contract 
would be weakened. Opportunism is less likely to occur in a strong social relationship, because both of them are 
trustworthy. Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) indicate that choosing a close partner, to some extent, can prevent 
opportunistic behavior. The closer the relationship between the executives in the alliance, the more channels and 
the higher the quality of information exchange. Moreover, due to the information asymmetry, the problems of 
alliance members can be reduced. Based on this, the following hypotheses H2 and H3 are proposed: 
H2: Corporate executives’ social relations negatively affect opportunistic behavior. 
H3: Opportunistic behavior negatively affects the stability of strategic alliance. 
2.2.2 The mediating role of trust 
Trust among alliance partners is an important factor affecting the stable development of the alliance, and the trust 
between alliance partners has a certain connection with the social relationship of senior managers. Zhu and Qi 
(2016) reveal that the strength of member relationship has a positive impact on trust between partners. Crssar et al 
(2011) use experimental research methods to study the impact of interpersonal relationships on trust between 
partners in social networks. The results show that trust level is affected by the relationship between the two sides. 
Das and Teng (2000) believe that the trust relationship between partners is an important foundation and premise 
for the success of the strategic alliance, and trust is regarded as the most important factor affecting the performance 
of the alliance. Trusted alliance members tend to use resources for long-term development rather than for 
immediate interests and it is conducive to the stable development of the strategic alliance. Therefore, H4 and H5 
hypotheses are proposed: 
H4: Corporate executives’ social relations positively affect trust among partners. 
H5: Trust among partners positively affect the stability of strategic alliance. 
 
2.3 The moderating role of contractual governance 
To a certain extent, contractual governance helps to enhance the inhibition of senior managers' social relations on 
opportunistic behavior. Due to the limited rationality of human beings, the social relations among executives can 
reduce the possibility of opportunistic behavior. And because of information asymmetry, self-interest and other 
problems, opportunism will also come into being. Contractual governance as a formal way of governance that 
embedded in the social network, can better moderate the behavior of partners, and effectively reduce the possibility 
of opportunistic behavior. Contract governance can adjust the influence of senior managers' social relations on 
opportunism. Wu et al (2009) believe that the contract helps to reduce the conflict of interest of cooperative 
members, increase the exchange of knowledge among organizations, and reduce opportunistic behavior. Therefore, 
it helps to improve the efficiency of cooperation. In addition, contract governance can adjust the influence of senior 
managers' social relationship on trust between partners to a certain extent. Contractual governance is a formal 
management mechanism and a substitute for social relations such as kinship, which can expand the scope of 
relations to a certain extent. Relevant research shows that contract governance can also affect trust among partners, 
and contracts can increase trust among partners whether the participants are close or not. However, some scholars 
have put forward different views on the trust relationship between contracts and partners. For example, as Faems 
et al (2008) demonstrate, contracts trigger different types of trust dynamics in the alliance. Excessive contracts can 
reduce the trust of partners, and appropriate contracts can have a positive impact on trust. The following H6 and 
H7 hypotheses are proposed: 
H6: Contractual governance enhances the impact of corporate executives' social relations on opportunistic 
behavior. 
H7: There is an inverted U-shape moderating effects of contract governance on the relationship between 
executives’ social relations and trust. 
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3. Research Design 
3.1 Questionnaire design 
In this study, a large number of related studies were combed before the design of questionnaire questions, and the 
research methods and measurement scales of related variables were used for reference. At the same time, with the 
help of several doctoral supervisors and doctors, we discussed and revised the questionnaire questions, modified 
some logical questions in the questionnaire, and improved them; After that, the questionnaire was distributed in a 
small range, and the final correction was made according to the actual results. 
The questionnaire consists of two parts: The first part includes the individual situation and the enterprise 
situation of the respondents, including the sample’s gender, age, education background and the time of holding the 
post of senior manager, the enterprise situation includes the nature of the sample's enterprise, the enterprise's 
duration, the enterprise scale, etc. Through the analysis of the basic situation of the respondents, we can grasp the 
basic situation and enterprise situation of the respondents, which is conducive to the preliminary judgment of the 
validity of the questionnaire. The second part is the main part of the questionnaire, which consists of the variable 
measurement scale, including the social relationship scale, opportunistic behavior scale, trust scale among partners, 
contract governance scale and alliance stability scale. 
 
3.2 Gauge design 
3.2.1 Measurement of corporate executives' social relations 
Granovetter (1973) believes that the strength of social relations can be reflected in the increase of communication 
time, emotional input, closeness and frequency of interaction. This study measures the strength of social relations 
between executives from two aspects, see Table 1: 
Table 1. Measurement topics of senior managers' social relations 
Variable Measurement questions 
Executives Often attend events with alliance partner executives. 
Social relations Often communicate via we-chat, phone or e-mail. 
3.2.2 Measurement of Opportunistic behavior 
Referring to the research of foreign scholars Wallenburg and Schaffler (2014), as shown in Table 2, this paper 
uses three items about opportunistic behavior, including violation of agreement, doing something beneficial to 
oneself and the completion of previous commitments. 
Table 2. Measurement of Opportunistic Behavior 
Variable Measurement questions 
Opportunistic 
behavior 
Partners sometimes violate agreements to achieve their own 
interests. 
Partners will do anything to benefit them. 
Some things that the partners did not fulfill their previous 
commitments. 
3.2.3 Measurement of trust between alliance partners 
The scale of trust among alliance partners is based on the research of Liu et al (2008). Liu and Tao (2007). The 
scale is designed from three aspects: trust in the other party’s ability to achieve goals, trust in the other party’s 
consideration of our interests and trust in the other party’s cooperation attitude. As shown in Table 3: 
Table 3. Trust Measurement Topics 
Variable Measurement questions 
 
Trust between 
partners 
Work with alliance partners to achieve goals. 
Alliance partners will consider our interests when making decisions 
involving interests. 
Alliance partners are sincere to us. 
 
3.3 Sample source and characteristics 
Through email, e-questionnaire and interview, this paper investigates the managers of 50 enterprises joining the 
strategic alliance, including Yuantong express, SF express, Youku and Alibaba. A total of 327 questionnaires were 
collected, 106 of which were filled in by the grass-roots employees and 106 of which were incomplete. 221 valid 
questionnaires were obtained, with an effective rate of 68.8%. See Table 4. 
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Table 4. Basic Information of Survey Sample 
Essential 
information 
Project 
Sample 
size 
Percentage 
Nature of 
enterprise 
State-owned enterprise 47 21.3% 
Private enterprise 123 55.7% 
Three foreign-funded enterprises (Sino foreign joint ventures, 
Sino foreign cooperative ventures, foreign-funded enterprises) 
51 23.1% 
Enterprise scale 
Below 100 people 63 28.5% 
100-500 person 69 31.2% 
500-1000 person 33 14.9% 
Over 1000 people 56 25.3% 
Duration of 
enterprise 
3 years and less 39 17.6% 
3-7 years 95 43.0% 
7 years and above 87 39.4% 
Sex 
Male 166 75.1% 
female 55 24.9% 
Age 
25 and under 0 0 
26-30 years old 6 2.7% 
30-40 years old 87 39.4% 
41-50 years old 83 37.6% 
51-60 years old 31 14.0% 
Over 60 years old 14 6.3% 
Education 
Undergraduate 126 57.0% 
Master student 52 23.5% 
Doctoral students 30 13.6% 
Junior college and below 13 5.9% 
Time as an 
executive 
3 years and less 65 29.4% 
3-6 years 77 34.8% 
6 years and above 79 35.7% 
 
4. Data Analysis and Result Discussion 
4.1 Reliability and validity test 
4.1.1 Reliability test 
The reliability of the questionnaire is analyzed by applying the α reliability coefficient method to test the reliability. 
Spss21.0 was used to test the reliability of each variable. The results are shown in Table 5 below, which shows 
that all the indexes in this paper have good reliability. 
Table 5. Reliability Analysis 
Variable Cronbach α Item number 
Executive social relations 0.819 3 
Contract governance 0.863 4 
Opportunistic behavior 0.846 3 
Trust between partners 0.796 3 
Alliance stability 0.801 3 
4.1.2 Validity test 
(1) KMO test and Bartlett spherical test 
Firstly, KMO test and Bartlett spherical test are used to test the data. Generally, when KMO value is greater than 
0.7 and Bartlett test is significant, factor analysis is suitable. KMO value of the data is 0.859, Bartlett's test chi 
square value is 1662.536, and the significance is 0.000. According to the test results, it is concluded that the 
construction validity of this paper is good and the data is suitable for the next step of factor analysis.  
(2) Exploratory factor analysis 
The orthogonal rotation method is used to rotate the factors, and the total variance table is explained as shown in 
Table 6 below. According to the datum with eigenvalue greater than 1, five common factors are extracted from 
the results, and the eigenvalues of the five common factors are 6.009, 1.967, 1.552, 1.179 and 1.033, and 37.557%, 
12.293%, 9.703%, 7.366% and 6.453% of the total variance were explained respectively, and the contribution rates 
were 37.557%, 49.850%, 59.553%, 66.919% and 73.372% respectively. Generally, if the cumulative contribution 
rate is more than 60%, it is considered that the extracted factors have better explanatory ability to each variable. 
The cumulative contribution rate of this paper is 73.372%. According to the results, it can be judged that the 
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extracted 5 common factors can explain the information contained in the 16 original items.  
In table 7, the load value of each main component corresponding item after the rotation of 16 items is greater than 
0.5, and the rotated item can correspond to the assumed dimension one by one, indicating that the paper has good 
construct validity. 
Table 6. Total Variance of Interpretation 
 
   Initial eigenvalue Extract the sum of load squares Sum of squares of rotating loads
Total Variance%Cumula-tive % Total Variance% Cumula-tive %Total Variance% Cumula-tive % 
1 6.009 37.557 37.557 6.009 37.557 37.557 2.903 18.146 18.146 
2 1.967 12.293 49.850 1.967 12.293 49.850 2.285 14.279 32.425 
3 1.552 9.703 59.553 1.552 9.703 59.553 2.213 13.830 46.255 
4 1.179 7.366 66.919 1.179 7.366 66.919 2.180 13.622 59.877 
5 1.033 6.453 73.372 1.033 6.453 73.372 2.159 13.495 73.372 
6 .589 3.681 77.053       
7 .503 3.141 80.194       
8 .495 3.093 83.288       
9 .460 2.872 86.160       
10 .392 2.449 88.609       
11 .368 2.301 90.909       
12 .345 2.154 93.064       
13 .329 2.056 95.120       
14 .294 1.838 96.958       
15 .277 1.730 98.688       
16 .210 1.312 100.000       
 
Table 7. Composition Matrix after Rotation 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
Contract governance 1 .857     
Contract governance 3 .811     
Contract governance 2 .811     
Contract governance 4 .785     
Executive social relations 1  .842    
Executive social relations 2  .817    
Executive social relations 3  .805    
Opportunistic behavior 2   .796   
Opportunistic behavior 1   .792   
Opportunistic behavior 3   .775   
Alliance stability 2    .839  
Alliance stability 3    .782  
Alliance stability 1    .740  
Trust between partners 3     .829 
Trust between partners 2     .792 
Trust between partners 1     .748 
(3) Test factor analysis 
Because exploratory factors are not rigorous in validity analysis, for test validity more strictly, this paper uses 
AMOS24.0 software to carry out confirmatory factor analysis. The confirmatory factor analysis chart and fitting 
values are shown in Figure 1 and table 8.  
The confirmatory factor analysis chart can clearly represent the dimensions measured in this paper and each 
item contained in each dimension.  
The factor loading of the items in all dimensions are higher than 0.5, indicating that the scale has good content 
validity. From the perspective of differentiated validity, the aggregation of each dimension is greater than that of 
other dimensions, indicating that the scale has a good differentiated validity. 
In the fitting value of confirmatory factor analysis, the ratio of chi square statistics to degrees of freedom 
(χ²/df) is less than 3 and with GFI, AGFI, NFI, IFI and TLI are all greater than 0.9, the RMSEA is less than 0.05, 
the model fits well. According to table 8. All measurement dimensions of the model are supported by good data. 
In conclusion, the scale has good structure validity. 
The convergence validity is judged by factor load, mean variance extraction and combination reliability. See 
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Table 9 below for details. From table 9, we can see that the factor loads of social relations, trust among partners, 
alliance stability, opportunistic behavior and contract governance are all greater than 0.6; The average variation 
extraction (AVE) was 0.603, 0.587, 0.587, 0.649 and 0.617, respectively, all of which were greater than 0.5; The 
combined reliability (CR) was 0.820, 0.809, 0.810, 0.847 and 0.865, respectively, which were greater than 0.6, 
indicating that the convergence validity of this study met the standard. 
Table 8 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Fitting 
Test volume Critical value Index 
χ²/ df < 5 suitable, < 3 good 1.119 
GFI ≥0.9 0.948 
AGFI ≥0.9 0.924 
NFI ≥0.9 0.938 
IFI ≥0.9 0.993 
TLI ≥0.9 0.991 
CFI 0.9 0.993 
RMSEA < 0.08 appropriate, < 0.05 good 0.023 
 
Figure 1. Confirmatory factor analysis chart 
Table 9. Convergence Validity 
Dimension Item Estimate CR AVE 
Executive social 
relations 
Executive social relations 1 0.795 
0.820 0.603 Executive social relations 2 0.791 
Executive social relations 3 0.743 
Trust between 
partners 
Trust1 0.746 
0.809 0.587 Trust2 0.699 
Trust3 0.846 
Alliance 
stability 
Alliance stability 1 0.716 
0.810 0.587 Alliance stability 2 0.814 
Alliance stability 3 0.766 
Opportunistic 
behavior 
opportunistic behavior 1 0.818 
0.847 0.649 opportunistic behavior 2 0.834 
opportunistic behavior 3 0.763 
Contract 
governance 
Contract governance 1 0.855 
0.865 0.617 
Contract governance 2 0.767 
Contract governance 3 0.778 
Contract governance 4 0.738 
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4.2 Variable correlation analysis 
Pearson's method is used to analyze the correlation among the five variables, namely, social relationship, 
contractual governance, opportunistic behavior, trust among partners, and alliance stability. The correlation of 
variables is used to measure the correlation between the two variables. The specific correlation coefficients are 
shown in Table 10 below. The results showed that the correlation between the variables was significant (P < 0.05). 
Table 10. Correlation among Variables 
Variable 
1.Executive 
social relations 
2. Contract 
governance 
3. Opportunistic 
behavior 
4. Trust between 
partners 
5.Alliance 
stability 
1. 0.777     
2. 0.261** 0.766    
3. -0.436** -0.397** 0.766   
4. 0.325** 0.345** -0.499** 0.806  
5. 0.352** 0.338** -0.523** 0.470** 0.786 
Notes：*for p<0.05,**for p<0.01,***for p<0.001 
 
4.3 Hypothesis test 
4.3.1 Test of direct and mediating effects 
(1) Model composition and model fitting 
According to the above reliability and validity test, and the theory of structural equation model, using amos24.0 
software, we draw the structural model of senior managers' social relations to opportunistic behavior, trust between 
partners, alliance stability and opportunistic behavior, trust between partners to alliance stability, as shown in 
Figure 2. The core of structural equation model test is the fit of the model. To test the fit between the model and 
the observation data, it needs to judge by the fit index. The fitting index of this model is shown in Table 11. 
 
Figure 2. Structure Model 
 
Table 11. Model Fitting 
Test volume Critical value Item 
χ²/ df < 5 suitable, < 3 good 1.864 
GFI ≥0.9 0.937 
AGFI ≥0.9 0.900 
NFI ≥0.9 0.924 
IFI ≥0.9 0.963 
TLI ≥0.9 0.950 
CFI ≥0.9 0.963 
RMSEA < 0.08 appropriate, < 0.05 good 0.063 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.12, No.6, 2020 
 
97 
 (2) Path coefficient and hypotheses test 
In this paper, the coefficients in the model are analyzed, and the specific coefficients and hypothesis test results 
are shown in Table 12. The path coefficient between executive social relationship and alliance stability is 0.076 (P 
= 0.431 > 0.05), which indicates that the influence of executive social relationship on alliance stability does not 
exist, and the H1 hypothesis does not hold. The path coefficient between the social relationship of senior managers 
and opportunistic behavior is -0.565 (P < 0.001), which indicates that there is a significant negative effect of the 
social relationship of senior managers on opportunistic behavior, and the H2 hypothesis holds. The path coefficient 
between opportunistic behavior and alliance stability is -0.433 (P < 0.001), which shows that opportunistic 
behavior has a significant negative impact on alliance stability, H3 hypothesis holds. The path coefficient between 
executive social relationship and trust among partners is 0.442 (P < 0.001), which indicates that there is a 
significant positive effect of executive social relationship on trust among partners, and H4 hypothesis holds. The 
path coefficient between trust among partners and alliance stability is 0.304 (P < 0.001), which indicates that trust 
among partners has a significant positive impact on alliance stability, and H5 hypothesis holds. 
Table 12. Path Coefficient and Hypothesis Test 
Route 
Standardized 
regression coefficient 
S.E. C.R. P 
Opportunistic 
behavior 
<-- 
Executive social 
relations 
-0.565 0.088 -6.772 *** 
Trust between 
partners 
<--
- 
Executive social 
relations 
0.442 0.091 5.013 *** 
Alliance stability 
<--
- 
Executive social 
relations 
0.076 0.080 0.788 0.431 
Alliance stability 
<--
- 
Opportunistic 
behavior 
-0.433 0.080 -4.278 *** 
Alliance stability 
<--
- 
Trust between 
partners 
0.304 0.073 3.358 *** 
Notes: *for p<0.05; **for p<0.01, ***for p<0.001 
4.3.2 Regression analysis of moderating effects 
In order to test the regulatory role of contract governance in the impact of senior managers’ social relations on 
opportunistic behavior, this paper uses the hierarchical regression method to establish multiple models for analysis, 
and the results are shown in Table 13. The first level includes the control variables, such as gender, age, education 
background, nature of the enterprise, duration, length of service of senior executives, and enterprise scale. In the 
second layer, we add the independent variable executive social relations. In the third layer, the regulatory variable 
contract governance is added, and in the fourth layer, the interaction item social relations of senior managers × 
contract governance is added.  
Regression analysis showed that contractual governance had a moderating effect on the influence of senior 
managers' social relations on opportunistic behavior (β = -0.242, P < 0.01). After the interaction term of social 
relations of senior managers × contract governance is added, the negative effect of social relations of senior 
managers on opportunistic behavior is enhanced. As a moderator, contract governance can positively moderate the 
impact of social relations of senior managers on opportunistic behavior. H6 hypothesis is verified. 
Table 13. The Moderating Effect of Contract Governance in The H6 Hypothesis 
Variable 
Dependent variable: opportunistic behavior 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Control variable     
Sex 0.001 -0.014 -0.024 -0.049 
Age -0.022 -0.029 -0.003 0.029 
Education 0.075 0.003 0.011 0.025 
Nature of enterprise -0.063 -0.028 -0.009 -0.030 
Years of existence -0.014 -0.040 -0.055 -0.060 
Duration of senior- management 0.049 0.081 0.067 0.046 
Enterprise scale -0.058 0.008 -0.020 -0.032 
Independent variable     
Executive social relations  -0.443*** -0.363*** -0.373*** 
Moderator variable     
Contract governance   -0.304*** -0.333*** 
Interaction item     
Executive social relations × contractual governance    -0.242*** 
R2 0.012 0.200 0.285 0.340 
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Variable 
Dependent variable: opportunistic behavior 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ΔR2 -0.021 0.170 0.254 0.309 
F 0.360 6.631***  9.325*** 10.836*** 
Notes：* for p<0.05，** for p<0.01，*** for p<0.001 
To test the inverted U-shaped moderating effect of contract governance on the trust between executive social 
relations and partners, the hierarchical regression method was used to establish multiple models for analysis, and 
the results are shown in table 14. The first level includes the control variables, such as gender, age, education 
background, nature of the enterprise, duration, length of service of senior executives, and enterprise scale. In the 
second layer, we add the independent variable executive social relations. In the third layer, we add moderating 
variable contract governance, and in the fourth layer, we add interaction item social relations of senior managers 
× contract governance. In the fifth layer, the interactive senior managers' social relations × contractual governance 
parties are added. The results of regression analysis show that there is a moderating effect of contract governance 
on the trust between senior managers and their partners (β = 0.200, P < 0.01). At the same time, the moderating 
effect of contract governance on the square value of senior managers' social relations on trust among partners 
reached a significant level (β = -0.324, P < 0.01), it shows that there is a quadratic function relationship between 
contract governance and the regulation of trust relationship between senior managers' social relations and alliance 
partners, and β is negative. It shows that the opening of quadratic curve is downward, indicating that contract 
governance plays an inverted U-shaped role in the influence of senior managers' social relations on trust between 
partners. H7 hypothesis is verified. 
According to the above analysis, the path map of the impact of corporate executives' social relations on the 
stability of strategic alliance is obtained, as shown in Figure 3. 
+
Alliance stability
-
+
Executive 
social relations
Opportunistic 
behavior
Trust between 
partners
-
Contract
Contract
+
Inverted U type
 
Figure 3. The Influence Path of Senior Managers' social Relations on Alliance Stability 
 
Table 14. The Moderating Effect of Contract Governance in The H7 Hypothesis 
Variable 
Dependent variable: Trust between partners 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Control variable      
Sex -0.151 -0.139 -0.130 -0.104 -0.135 
Age 0.108 0.113 0.089 0.056 0.075 
Education 0.032 0.089 0.082 0.067 0.062 
Nature of enterprise -0.068 -0.095 -0.113 -0.091 -0.092 
Years of existence 0.032 0.052 0.066 0.071 0.071 
Duration of senior- management -0.134* -0.160** -0.146* -0.125* -0.114** 
Enterprise scale 0.014 -0.038 -0.012 0.000 -0.013 
Independent variable      
Executive social relations  0.350*** 0.276*** 0.286*** 0.510*** 
Moderator variable      
Contract governance   0.281*** 0.311*** 0.357*** 
Interaction item      
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Variable 
Dependent variable: Trust between partners 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Executive social relations × contractual 
governance 
   
0.251*** 0.200** 
Executive social relations × contractual 
governance party 
    
-0.324** 
R2 0.074 0.155 0.227 0.287 0.327 
ΔR2 0.012 0.123 0.194 0.253 0.291 
F 2.615 4.844*** 6.871*** 8.447*** 9.228*** 
Notes：* for p<0.05，** for p<0.01，*** for p<0.001 
4.3.3 Discussion 
Based on the above empirical analysis of the impact of entrepreneurs' social relations on the stability of strategic 
alliance, the results are discussed. 
(1) Through data analysis, it is found that the hypothesis of "corporate executives' social relations positively affect 
alliance stability" is not true, and the analysis results show that corporate executives' social relations have no direct 
impact on alliance stability. There is no direct relationship between senior managers' social relations and alliance 
stability, but it needs to influence alliance stability by influencing intermediate variables. This is different from 
Costa's (2018) research. He believes that the stable development of the strategic alliance portfolio is influenced by 
the exchange efficiency of knowledge and information and the learning and exploration ability of its members.  At 
the same time, the strong trust and reciprocity among members are also conducive to the stable development of 
the alliance [30]. He believes that the social relations of alliance members and the system of other elements directly 
affect the stability of strategic alliance. This paper argues that the social relationship of executives can not directly 
affect the stability of strategic alliance, but indirectly affect the stability of alliance through the change of 
intermediate factors.  
(2) The data analysis shows that the social relationship of senior managers has a negative impact on opportunistic 
behavior. Wathne and Heide (2000) believe that choosing reliable partners will reduce the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior and reduce information asymmetry between partners to inhibit opportunistic behavior. This 
study believes that a good social relationship between senior executives can help to open up information block and 
reduce information asymmetry, which is similar to the existing research. Foreign scholar Barney (1994) believe 
that if there is a strong social relationship between partners, whether there are strict regulations or restrictions, 
there will be no opportunistic behavior between them, because good social relations between them make their 
cooperation more stable, and there is no opportunistic behavior. This view is consistent with this study. This study 
believes that the social relationship of entrepreneurs in strategic alliances has a direct impact on opportunistic 
behavior, good social relations are conducive to information exchange and trust building among alliance members, 
for reduce the occurrence of opportunistic behaviors. Good social relations can indirectly improve the stability of 
strategic alliance by reducing the occurrence of opportunistic behavior. 
(3) The results show that opportunistic behavior has negative influence on alliance stability. Ge et al (2017) said 
that the formation of strategic alliances by enterprises in different industries can help enterprises to break the 
resource dilemma, but opportunistic behavior will reduce cooperation motivation and affect the stability of the 
alliance. Cui and Hu (2011) divide the intellectual property protection system into weak intellectual property 
protection system and strong intellectual property protection system based on evolutionary game, the dynamic 
system equation of technological innovation alliance stability based on opportunistic behavior guarantee alliance 
system is constructed, and the results show that the imperfect institutional environment among the members of 
technological innovation alliance will greatly increase the probability of opportunistic behavior, this will reduce 
the competitiveness and cohesion of technological innovation alliance. In this paper, the influence of opportunism 
on the stability of alliance is the same as that of previous studies. 
(4) Corporate executives' social relationship has a positive impact on trust between partners, which means that a 
good social relationship between executives is conducive to the establishment of trust between alliance partners. 
Zhu and Qi also put forward the same view, and their research shows that the strength of member relationship has 
a positive impact on trust between partners. The greater the intensity of social relations among executives, the 
smoother the communication between enterprises, and the easier to promote the formation of trust mechanism. 
When Smith studied customer relationship management, he pointed out that there are good and long-term social 
relationships between partners. It is easy to form an economic, emotional, psychological and material dependence 
in the process of cooperation, which makes the partners more closely linked(Smith B 1998). This is very similar 
to the point of view of this study. Trust can be considered as the kind of economic, emotional, psychological and 
material dependence of Smith. 
(5) From the results of data analysis, it is found that trust among partners has a positive impact on the stability of 
alliance, which means that a higher trust relationship among alliance members will be conducive to the stable 
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development of strategic alliance. Ganesan (1994) believes that trust is the emotional hub in the process of business 
transactions and an important reason for the continuity of business relations. The higher the degree of trust, the 
more willing the alliance partners are to maintain the cooperative relationship between the two sides. Based on the 
study of Japan's strategic alliance, Cullen (2000) focused on mutual trust and commitment between partners, 
established a dynamic adjustment model based on trust and commitment, and found that trust can affect the 
performance of the alliance and the realization of the objectives of the alliance. The viewpoint of this study is 
consistent with the existing research. The trust relationship between partners is an indispensable factor in the 
development of strategic alliance. When the trust degree between alliance members is high, the communication 
obstacle of information between alliance members is reduced. Alliance members will consider the overall interests 
of the alliance while considering their own interests and pay more attention to the development of the alliance. 
Alliance members are more willing to solve the problems in the alliance together to ensure the stable development 
of the alliance. 
(6) Contractual governance enhances the impact of corporate executives' social relations on opportunistic behavior, 
which means that contractual governance, as a formal way of governance, can better regulate the behavior of 
alliance members when embedded in social networks. Lorenz (1999) believes that through the control of contracts 
and other contracts, mutual trust can be promoted. Contract can increase trust between partners, even if the 
participants are very close, it can also promote the accumulation of trust between the two sides. According to 
Cohen-charash and Spector's (2001) organizational justice framework of "environment and personal factors 
fairness perception attitude and behavior", individuals will have a sense of fairness (or unfairness) under external 
stimulation. This sense of fairness (or unfairness) will further affect the attitude and behavior of members. The 
existing literature has studied the relationship between contractual governance and alliance stability, but no 
relevant research has been found to study the relationship between contractual governance as a moderating variable 
and the stability of strategic alliance. This paper studies that contractual governance as a moderating variable will 
enhance the impact of corporate executives' social relations on opportunistic behavior, thus affecting the stability 
of strategic alliance. 
(7) Contract governance reverses the U-shaped regulation of the impact of corporate executives' social relations 
on trust, it shows that in the strategic alliance with poor social relations of senior managers, effective contract is 
the necessary condition to ensure cooperation. Making a contract is helpful to establish a preliminary trust 
relationship in the environment of poor social relations among senior executives, so as to promote the development 
of social relations among senior executives and further improve the level of trust among partners; However, when 
the social relationship among the members of the alliance is high, too many contracts will produce a negative 
signal of "distrust" and reduce the impact of the social relationship on trust. This is different from Lorenz's (1999) 
point of view. He believes that through the control of contracts and other contracts, mutual trust can be promoted. 
This is similar to the point of view which is proposed by Faem (2008). He studies the direct relationship between 
contract and trust and points out that contracts trigger different types of trust dynamics (negative and positive) in 
the alliance. Excessive contracts will reduce the trust of partners, and appropriate contracts can have a positive 
impact on trust (Faems D 2008). 
 
5 Research Conclusion 
In recent years, the market competition mode is becoming more and more diversified and complex, which makes 
it difficult for enterprises to survive alone in the current fierce market competition, so strategic alliance, a new 
modern organizational form, emerges as the times require. Through strategic alliance, member enterprises can 
share R & D achievements, reduce production and operation costs, and obtain more resources. In theory, the 
conclusion of strategic alliance is conducive to the development of enterprises, but in practice, many strategic 
alliances fail. Therefore, strategic alliance has gradually become the focus of scholars. In this study, 50 enterprises 
in the strategic alliance were investigated. SPSS21.0 and AMOS24.0 software were used to test the reliability and 
validity of the scale. The data obtained were used to verify the research hypothesis, and the following results were 
obtained:  
(1) At present, in many parts of the world, especially in China, "relationship culture" is one of the most important 
social cultures, and the business activities of enterprises will be affected by the social relations of executives to 
varying degrees. We subconsciously think that the stability of the strategic alliance will also be affected by the 
social relations of the enterprise executives. However, through the data analysis, we find that the hypothesis of 
"the social relations of the enterprise executives positively affect the stability of the alliance" is not true. The 
analysis results show that the social relations of the enterprise executives have no direct impact on the stability of 
the alliance. There is no direct relationship between senior managers' social relations and alliance stability, but it 
needs to affect the alliance stability by influencing the intermediate variables.  
(2) Corporate executives' social relations negatively affect opportunistic behavior. According to the "broker 
hypothesis", in economic activities, people who participate in business activities always hope that they can get the 
maximum profit with the minimum effort. This phenomenon is more likely to happen in strategic alliances. If one 
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enterprise in the alliance tries to acquire the technology of other enterprises and share the resources invested but 
is not willing to invest too much strength in the alliance, and then opportunism happens. The stronger executive 
social relationship in alliance enterprises will reduce the information asymmetry among alliance members, and the 
better social relationship will promote the strategic decision-making of each enterprise's executives to focus on the 
collective interests and common goals of the whole alliance, thus reducing opportunistic behavior.  
(3) Opportunistic behavior negatively affects the stability of alliance. Opportunistic behavior will lead to serious 
information asymmetry among alliance members. In the short term, the input of alliance members is not in direct 
proportion to the income. In the long term, members are suspicious of each other. The alliance strategy formulated 
is more inclined to self-protection or self-profit, which ultimately makes the existence of the alliance meaningless 
and leads to failure. 
(4) Corporate executives' social relations will positively affect the trust between partners. Trust is a kind of 
psychological informal recognition relationship. Although the trust relationship is not restricted by law, it has a 
great impact on the operation and management of enterprises. A good social relationship between executives can 
effectively increase the formal and informal communication and interaction between executives of different 
enterprises, deepen the understanding of both sides, and promote the cooperation in business activities of both 
sides, so as to continuously build the common interests of both enterprises. At the same time, a good social 
relationship between senior executives will help to reduce the information asymmetry of alliance enterprises and 
help the managers of both sides to understand each other. These will be conducive to the establishment of trust 
among the alliance partners. 
(5) Trust among alliance partners has a positive impact on alliance stability. Trust is an important factor affecting 
the stability of the alliance. The members of the alliance have a high degree of trust, which is more conducive to 
the formulation and completion of the strategic objectives of the alliance. High trust of alliance members is 
conducive to the rational use of enterprise resources and the stable and healthy development of the alliance. At the 
same time, high trust can form a kind of recessive contract among alliance members, reduce information 
asymmetry, promote alliance members to contribute their own strength, and contribute to the stable development 
of the alliance. 
(6) Contractual governance enhances the impact of corporate executives' social relations on opportunistic behavior. 
Because of the "broker" hypothesis, people are the main body of economic activities in pursuit of the maximization 
of economic interests. Members of the strategic alliance are no exception, egoism, information asymmetry and 
other reasons will lead to opportunistic behavior. Although executive social relations can reduce the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior, when choosing opportunistic behavior can bring enough benefits to themselves, 
cooperative members will choose opportunistic behavior. Contract governance, as a formal way of governance, 
clearly points out the penalty measures for breach of contract, which can better moderate the behavior of partners 
when embedded in the social relationship network, avoid the possibility that partners choose opportunistic 
behavior to give up the possibility of maintaining the relationship between the two parties in the face of the 
temptation of great interests. 
(7) The stable development of strategic alliance cannot be separated from the binding governance of contract to 
alliance members. When the trust degree among the alliance partners is low, it is necessary to make appropriate 
contracts to restrict the behavior of members, regulate business activities, coordinate and solve existing and 
potential conflicts, and protect the rights and interests of alliance members. Therefore, when the social relationship 
of senior managers is general and the trust degree is poor, contractual governance promotes the positive influence 
of social relationship of senior managers on trust. This kind of situation often occurs in the initial stage of the 
establishment of strategic alliance, which needs to develop necessary contracts to stabilize the alliance. When the 
corporate executives have a good social relationship and a high degree of trust, more contracts will give the partners 
a sense of lack confidence, and form a rebellious psychology in cooperation, which is not conducive to the 
establishment of a good partnership and weakens the impact of the corporate executives' Social relationship on the 
trust between partners. 
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